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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Derrick Williams appeals from an "amended order" 
entered April 22, 1998, in this criminal case amending the 
judgment of sentence and conviction filed November 6, 
1992. The germane proceedings leading to the appeal are as 
follows. On November 6, 1992, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Williams pleaded guilty to an indictment 
charging him with conspiracy to possess with intent to 
distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. S 846. The plea agreement provided for a 
custodial sentence of 223 months to run concurrently with 
a Pennsylvania state sentence that Williams had been 
serving since June 1, 1989. Significantly, Williams was to 
receive credit against his federal sentence for all time 
served from June 1, 1989, in state custody. The agreement 
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provided that if the district court did not accept the 
agreement, it would be null and void. 
 
The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced 
Williams on the same day he entered the guilty plea, 
November 6, 1992, to a 223-month custodial term to run 
concurrently with the state sentence with credit to be given 
for all time served on the state sentence from June 1, 1989. 
Nevertheless, on July 25, 1997, the Bureau of Prisons 
wrote separate but similar letters to Williams and the 
Assistant United States Attorney who had been present at 
the plea and sentencing, explaining that the Bureau could 
not give the credit the court had ordered because 18 U.S.C. 
S 3585(b) required it to deny the credit. 1 
 
Williams, understandably, was not satisfied with the 
Bureau's position and consequently, on January 14, 1998, 
he filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255. In his motion, Williams 
contended that the government breached the plea 
agreement because (1) the Bureau of Prisons did not run 
the sentence from June 1, 1989, as ordered by the court; 
and (2) the United States Attorney did not notify the 
Bureau of Prisons that it was required to honor the plea 
agreement as incorporated in the judgment of conviction 
and sentence. Moreover, Williams contended that the 
conviction was obtained and sentence imposed "in violation 
of [his] Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel." Williams' theory on this point was that if the 
Bureau of Prisons could not award credit against the 
sentence from June 1, 1989, "it follows that defense 
counsel was ineffective for persuading [him] to accept a 
guilty plea with no perceptible benefits." Williams asked the 
court to vacate his conviction and sentence, relief which, if 
granted, would have allowed him, at his option, either to 
stand trial or plead guilty again. 
 
The government filed a response to the section 2255 
motion contending that it had not breached the plea 
agreement. Rather, it attributed the sentencing problem 
Williams identified to a mistake in the November 6, 1992 
judgment. Consequently, it proposed that the court amend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We need not detail the reasons why the Bureau took that position. 
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the judgment to reflect the provisions of U.S.S.G. 
S 5G1.3(b), so that Williams would serve a total combined 
term of imprisonment of 223 months, with credit for all 
time served on the state sentence from June 1, 1989. 
 
On April 21, 1998, the court entered an order partially 
granting Williams' motion under 28 U.S.C. S 2255. The 
court indicated that it would issue an amended judgment of 
conviction giving him credit for the time served on the state 
sentence from June 1, 1989, up to and including November 
5, 1992. The order, however, denied Williams' motion to 
vacate his conviction because the court held that the 
government did not breach the plea agreement, as there 
merely had been a mistake in the judgment that prevented 
the intent of the parties and the court from being 
effectuated. 
 
After next signing one order on April 21, 1998, amending 
the November 6, 1992 judgment of conviction and sentence, 
the court entered a superseding "amended order" on April 
22, 1998, reducing Williams' term from 223 months to 181 
months and 25 days, a sentence less than the lower end of 
the guideline range of 188 to 235 months that the court 
had calculated was applicable at the 1992 sentencing. The 
court provided that this reduced sentence would run 
concurrently, beginning November 6, 1992, with the 
undischarged portion of his state sentence. The court 
designated the state institution where Williams was serving 
the state sentence as the place for service of his federal 
sentence. 
 
The amended order also provided that the federal 
sentence was not a departure from the guidelines because 
Williams was being credited for guidelines purposes under 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) with 41 months and five days, the 
period from June 1, 1989, to November 5, 1992. It appears 
that the court entered the April 22, 1998 order amending 
the judgment in response to a letter the Assistant United 
States Attorney wrote the court on April 21, 1998, advising 
it of language that the Bureau of Prisons wished placed in 
the sentencing order for purposes of clarity. The April 22, 
1998 order partially tracks that language. The district court 
made no reference to a certificate of appealability in any of 
its three orders. 
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Williams has appealed from the amended order of April 
22, 1998, reducing his sentence to 181 months and 25 
days. He contends that the order violated the plea 
agreement, the court should have departed downward from 
the guidelines range and imposed a sentence consecutive to 
the state sentence to fulfill the plea agreement, his counsel 
at the plea and sentencing was ineffective for permitting 
him to bargain for an unenforceable agreement, and his 
guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
because he did not receive the consideration for which he 
bargained. Williams asks that his "conviction and sentence 
. . . be vacated" or, "[i]n the alternative," that we remand 
the matter to the district court for entry of an amended 
judgment that complies with the form and language 
required by the Bureau of Prisons as set forth in the April 
21, 1998 letter from the Assistant United States Attorney to 
the court to effectuate the parties' intent. 
 
The government initially answers that we "lack[ ] 
jurisdiction to consider . . . this appeal" because neither the 
district court nor this court issued a certificate of 
appealability as required by 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(B). Br. at 
8. It expands on that argument by contending that a court 
of appeals cannot issue a certificate of appealability unless 
the petitioner first applies to the district court for the 
certificate, a step Williams did not take. 
 
On the merits, the government argues that the district 
court's April 22, 1998 order is not ambiguous and complies 
with the plea agreement so that the court did not err in 
declining to depart downward from the guidelines range. It 
contends that Williams' real challenge is not to the district 
court's order. Rather, what concerns Williams is the 
possibility that the Bureau of Prisons will not carry out the 
April 22, 1998 order. The government asserts that this 
issue cannot be advanced in these proceedings, but 
instead, if it actually arises, Williams must seek relief 
through a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241. See Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 871, 874-75 (3d Cir. 
1976). The government also argues that Williams' attorney 
was not ineffective because Williams has obtained the 
sentence for which he bargained. Finally, the government 
contends that Williams' guilty plea was knowing and 
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voluntary as he obtained the sentence for which he 
bargained. 
 
Williams in his reply brief argues that while 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1)(B) provides that an appeal may not be taken 
from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. S 2255 
unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability, this proceeding does not come within that 
category. In Williams' view, there has not been afinal 
judgment here because the "order granting the[section 
2255 motion] in part and denying it in part," i.e., the first 
April 21, 1998 order, is not final because it"did not end the 
litigation on the merits, and did not leave nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment." Reply br. at 2, citing 
Waldorf v. Shuta, 142 F.3d 601, 611 (3d Cir. 1998). In 
making this argument, Williams contends that the April 22, 
1998 order is a final "order amending the judgment in a 
criminal case . . . not subject to the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(B)." Reply br. at 2. 
 
Williams also rejects the government's argument that he 
was required to apply to the district court for a certificate 
of appealability. In this regard, he cites Hohn v. United 
States, 118 S.Ct. 1969 (1998), in which the Supreme Court 
held that it had certiorari jurisdiction to review the denial 
of a certificate of appealability by a court of appeals in a 28 
U.S.C. S 2255 proceeding.2 See id. at 1978. The significance 
of Hohn, as Williams sees it, is that in that case even 
though the petitioner did not seek a certificate of 
appealability from the district court, the Supreme Court did 




2. In a situation such as that in Hohn, in which a section 2255 motion 
was filed before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), but the district court denied relief 
after that date, we have held that a petitioner need not obtain a 
certificate of appealability. See United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178 
(3d Cir. 1997). Skandier seems to reflect the prevailing view. See United 
States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. 
filed 
(U.S. Sept. 9, 1998) (No. 98-6050). The Supreme Court did not mention 
this possibility in Hohn, instead, without discussion, treating the AEDPA 
as applying to that case. 
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Williams also relies on United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 
470 (3d Cir. 1997), in which we held that in a 28 U.S.C. 
S 2255 case under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996), a district judge could issue a certificate 
of appealability under 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(B). See id. at 
473. Williams argues that there is no jurisdictional 
requirement for the district court to act on a request for a 
certificate of appealability because in Eyer we exercised 
jurisdiction on the basis of a certificate of appealability 
issued by the district court that did not indicate, as 
required by 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3), the specific issue 
demonstrating that the petitioner made a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See id. at 
474. It thus appears that Williams does not distinguish 
situations in which a district court issued a defective 
certificate from those in which the court took no action at 
all with respect to a certificate. Finally, Williams argues 
that even if a certificate of appealability is required, his 
failure to apply to the district court for a certificate "is 
something in the nature of a procedural default, not a 




Until the enactment of the AEDPA "a petitioner in federal 
custody who was denied relief by a district court on a 
section 2255 motion could appeal to a court of appeals 
without obtaining a certificate of probable cause." Eyer, 113 
F.3d at 472. On the other hand, before the AEDPA, a 
petitioner challenging detention arising out of process issue 
by a state court needed a certificate of probable cause to 
appeal. See id. "The AEDPA changed these procedures; in 
particular the Act replaced certificates of probable cause 
with certificates of appealability and required prisoners in 
federal custody to obtain a certificate of appealability to 
appeal from the denial of relief under section 2255." Id. 
Williams filed his section 2255 motion after the effective 
date of the AEDPA, and consequently it ordinarily would be 
clear that he would need a certificate of appealability to 
appeal from a final order disposing of his motion. See 
United States v. Skandier, 125 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
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Williams seeks to avoid this seemingly obvious 
conclusion by arguing that he is not appealing from a "final 
order in a proceeding under S 2255." See 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1)(B). Rather, he claims that he is appealing from 
an order amending the judgment in a criminal case. The 
difficulty with this argument is that section 2255 provides 
that if the movant is entitled to relief "the court shall vacate 
and set the judgment aside and shall discharge the 
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct 
the sentence as may appear appropriate." Of course, here 
the court corrected the sentence to carry out the plea 
agreement.3 Thus, it seems clear that the April 22, 1998 
order was the final disposition of Williams' section 2255 
motion. See Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 339, 
83 S.Ct. 1236, 1239 (1963). After all, the district court in 
entering the first April 21, 1998 and April 22, 1998 orders 
did exactly what section 2255 contemplates. Accordingly, 
while the first order of April 21, 1998, which partially 
granted Williams' section 2255 motion, was not afinal 
order, as the court in that order anticipated issuing a 
further order, i.e., an amended judgment of conviction, and 
actually did so, the entry of the April 22, 1998 order, 
modifying Williams' sentence, seemingly was a final order in 
a section 2255 proceeding, as following its entry there were 
no further proceedings pending or contemplated in the 
district court. 
 
Moreover, we point out that it is difficult to understand 
the source of the court's jurisdiction to amend the 
judgment of conviction, as it did here, except as an aspect 
of the section 2255 proceeding. After all, courts do not have 
freewheeling powers to amend six-year old judgments in 
criminal cases. 
 
Yet we have no need here to determine whether if 
Williams merely had appealed from the sentencing aspects 
of the April 22, 1998 order, we still would require a 
certificate of appealability to entertain this appeal because 
Williams challenges more than his sentence. As we have 
indicated, he argues that his "conviction and sentence must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Our result would not be different if we characterized the April 22, 
1998 order as a resentencing. 
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be vacated." Br. at 18. Such an outcome would be 
quintessential relief in a section 2255 proceeding entitling 
Williams to a new trial. Williams requests only"[i]n the 
alternative" that a new form of judgment be entered. 
Furthermore, in seeking the vacation of his conviction, he 
relies on the argument that at the time he pleaded guilty 
and was sentenced on November 6, 1992, his attorney was 
ineffective and that his guilty plea was not knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. These contentions relate to 
proceedings that simply cannot be characterized as an 
aspect of an appeal from the April 22, 1998 order. Thus, we 
cannot regard these proceedings as being nothing more 
than an appeal from a sentence. Consequently, we leave for 
another day the determination of whether a movant who 
obtains a modified sentence on a section 2255 motion may 
appeal from the new sentence without obtaining a 
certificate of appealability if he seeks nothing more on the 
appeal than relief from the sentence. 
 
We recognize that Williams argues that the requirement 
in 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(B), that unless "a circuit justice or 
judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may 
not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order on 
a proceeding under section 2255" is merely procedural. We, 
however, reject that argument because the language that 
without a certificate "an appeal may not be taken" is 
completely clear. A court entertaining an application for a 
certificate of appealability has a gatekeeper's role. See 
Hohn, 118 S.Ct. at 1974-75 ("We further disagree with the 
contention . . . that a request to proceed before a court of 
appeals should be regarded as a threshold inquiry separate 
from the merits which, if denied, prevents the case from 
ever being in the court of appeals."); Hohn, 118 S.Ct. at 
1979 (dissenting opinion) ("By the plain language of 
AEDPA, his appeal `from' the district court's `final order' 
`may not be taken to the court of appeals.' "). 
 
Our conclusion that a certificate of appealability is 
required for this appeal to go forward does not necessarily 
compel us to dismiss the appeal. After all, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2253(c)(1)(B) empowers circuit judges to issue certificates 
of appealability in section 2255 cases. The government, 
however, on the basis of four cases it cites, contends that 
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the weight of authority supports a conclusion that a court 
of appeals may not issue a certificate of appealability unless 
the petitioner first unsuccessfully applies to the district 
court for a certificate. See United States v. Youngblood, 116 
F.3d 1113, 1114 (5th Cir. 1997); Edwards v. United States, 
114 F.3d 1083, 1084 (11th Cir. 1997); Muniz v. Johnson, 
114 F.3d 43, 45 (5th Cir. 1997); Lozada v. United States, 
107 F.3d 1011, 1017 (2d Cir. 1997), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Perez, 129 F.3d 255, 260 (2d 
Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 9, 1998) (No. 
98-6050). But, as the government acknowledges, we have 
"not yet addressed the issue of [our] jurisdiction to grant or 
deny a [certificate of appealability] absent a ruling by the 
district court on that question." Br. at 8. 
 
The government, however, cites our local Rule 22.2 which 
provides as follows: 
 
        At the time a final order denying a petition under 28 
       U.S.C. S 2255 is issued, the district judge shall make a 
       determination as to whether a certificate of 
       appealability should issue. If the district judge issues a 
       certificate, the judge shall state the specific issue or 
       issues that satisfy the criteria of 28 U.S.C. S 2253. If 
       an order denying a petition under S 2254 or S 2255 is 
       accompanied by an opinion or a magistrate judge's 
       report, it is sufficient if the order denying the certificate 
       references the opinion or report. 
 
The government infers from Rule 22.2 that we have taken 
the same position as the courts in Youngblood, Edwards, 
Muniz, and Lozada. The government, though, does not take 
into account that we drafted Rule 22.2 before we decided 
Eyer, in which we held that a district court could issue a 
certificate of appealability in a section 2255 proceeding. 
Prior to Eyer that issue was unsettled in this circuit. Thus, 
our committee comments to Rule 22.2, in order to avoid 
deciding that legal issue inferentially, provided that "[t]his 
rule takes no position on the question of whether a district 
court can grant or deny a certificate of appealability." 
Accordingly, it is difficult to accept an argument that Rule 
22.2 requires an application first to the district court for a 
certificate of appealability when the committee drafting the 
rule was uncertain whether a district court even could 
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issue a certificate. Furthermore, Rule 22.2 simply does not 
say that a circuit judge cannot issue a certificate of 
appealability unless the district court first has denied the 
certificate. 
 
Nevertheless, we conclude that we need not decide 
whether a petitioner first must apply to the district court 
for a certificate of appealability. We recognize that the 
Supreme Court in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Environment, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012-16 (1998), disapproved 
the practice of a court of appeals, such as in Eyer, 113 F.3d 
at 474-75, avoiding difficult jurisdictional questions when a 
merits determination would favor the party who would 
benefit if it declined to exercise jurisdiction. But if we were 
to determine that we will not issue a certificate of 
appealability because Williams has not demonstrated that 
he is entitled to one under 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(3), then we 
would find that this court does not have jurisdiction to go 
forward in this appeal. On the other hand, if we were to 
find that we cannot issue a certificate of appealability 
because Williams did not apply for a certificate to the 
district court, we also would determine that we do not have 
jurisdiction to go forward. In these circumstances, we 
conclude that Steel Co. does not preclude us from treating 
Williams' notice of appeal as a request for a certificate of 
appealability and then denying it on the merits without first 
determining that Williams was not obliged initially to apply 
to the district court for a certificate of appealability.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Notwithstanding our disposition of this case surely, at least as a 
matter of practice in cases in which the district court has not ruled on 
the certificate of appealability issue in thefinal order as required by 
our 
local rule 22.2, an unsuccessful movant in a section 2255 case should 
in the first instance seek a certificate of appealability from the 
district 
court. See Fitzsimmons v. Yeager, 391 F.2d 849, 851-55 (3d Cir. 1968) 
(en banc). Thus, we recognize that it might be appropriate for us to 
dismiss the appeal or to remand the matter to the district court for 
consideration of Williams' notice of appeal as a request for a certificate 
of appealability. We, however, do not do so because we believe that 
Williams' attorney acted in good faith in not seeking the certificate and 
the result we reach denying a certificate of appealability is quite 
straightforward. Cf. Eyer, 113 F.3d at 474 (case not remanded to district 
court that issued certificate of appealability to specify issues 
warranting 
its issuance because, inter alia, reason court issued certificate was 
obvious). In the circumstances, we naturally do not wish to protract 
these proceedings. 
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We are satisfied that Williams has not "made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 
28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2), as the government is correct that 
Williams' position as to what may happen in the future is 
completely speculative. Furthermore, in the unlikely 
circumstance that the Bureau of Prisons does not honor 
the district court's intention, Williams will be free to seek 




For the foregoing reasons we conclude that we do not 
have jurisdiction and the appeal will be dismissed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
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